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Abstract
Primitives are basic means provided by a microkernel to implementors of operating system services. Inten-
sively used within every OS and commonly implemented in a mixture of high-level and assembly program-
ming languages, primitives are meaningful and challenging candidates for formal veriﬁcation. We report
on the accomplished correctness proof of academic microkernel primitives. We describe how a novel ap-
proach to veriﬁcation of programs written in C with inline assembler is successfully applied to a piece of
realistic system software. Necessary and suﬃcient criteria covering functional correctness and requirements
for the integration into a formal model of memory virtualization are determined and formally proven. The
presented results are important milestones on the way to a pervasively veriﬁed operating system.
Keywords: Formal Veriﬁcation, Theorem Proving, Operating System, Microkernel, Inline Assembler.
1 Introduction
Correctness guarantees for computer systems is a hot research topic. Since there are
a lot of examples when the correctness of separate computer components has been
successfully established, the formal veriﬁcation of an entire industrial-size system is
being brought to the forefront. In [8] Moore, the head of the famous CLI project,
proposes the grand challenge of whole computer system pervasive veriﬁcation.
Verisoft 3 is a research project inspired by the problem of a complete computer
system correctness. The project aims at the development of the pervasive veriﬁca-
tion technology [10] and demonstrating it by applying to an exemplary computer
system. A prototypic system comprises (i) a pipelined microprocessor with mem-
ory management units, (ii) a number of devices, in particular, a hard disk, (iii) a
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microkernel, (iv) a simple operating system, and (v) an exemplary user applica-
tion. Pervasive formal veriﬁcation of the whole system is attempted. The process
is supported by a variety of computer aided veriﬁcation tools, both interactive and
automated, in order to minimize the possibility of errors induced by veriﬁcation
engineers.
This work relates to the problem of operating system microkernel correctness.
A microkernel is the minimal kernel which, basically, provides no operating system
services at all, but only the mechanisms necessary to implement such services. The
mechanisms include process and memory management, address spaces, low-level
IPC, and I/O. Usually, they are implemented in the form of primitives, microkernel
routines which provide this functionality to the upper layers. Since every service of
an operating system makes use of primitives, the correctness of the latter becomes
of special importance.
In the current paper we discuss the correctness issues of primitives of an academic
operating system microkernel. We describe how the methodology for the system
software veriﬁcation developed in the frame of Verisoft is successfully applied to
primitives implemented in C with inline assembler. We outline the correctness
criteria of microkernel primitives. Stating the correctness theorems we show what
it means that a primitive fulﬁlls these correctness criteria. We sketch a general idea
how such theorems are proven. In a case study we elaborate on particular for the
example details of speciﬁcations and proofs.
The contribution of this paper is that (i) all necessary and suﬃcient correctness
criteria of primitives of a microkernel for a pervasively veriﬁed system are deter-
mined and formally proven, (ii) a novel, convenient for formal use, approach to
veriﬁcation of C with inline assembler programs is presented, and (iii) an important
part of a realistic microkernel is proven correct showing that seamless formal veri-
ﬁcation of crucial parts of operating systems is feasible. All material presented in
the paper is supported by formal theories in a computer aided theorem prover.
Related Work
A number of research projects suggest ideas to microkernel veriﬁcation. Choos-
ing reasoning either in C or assembler semantics, to the best of our knowledge,
nobody exploits their combination. The L4.veriﬁed project, targets at constructing
seL4 [4], a formally veriﬁed operating system kernel. From the system’s prototype
designed in Haskel both formal model and C implementation are generated. A
richer compared to Verisoft subset of C including pointer arithmetic is used, which,
however, provides less expressive semantics than inline assembler as the latter makes
possible to accesses even registers of a processor. A substantial progress seems to
be achieved in the veriﬁcation of the model, but only exemplary parts of the source
code are reported veriﬁed. The FLINT project exploits an x86 assembly code veriﬁ-
cation environment for certiﬁcation of context switching routines [9], an important
microkernel part. No results on integration of object code correctness into a high-
level programming language are reported. The recent Robin project aims at the
veriﬁcation of Nova microhypervisor [12]. Although implementation is in (a subset
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of) C++ with inline assembler, the veriﬁcation is planned to cover only C++ parts.
Currently there is no connection to real object code, which seems to be planned
for the (far) future. It is planned to build a model precise enough to catch virtual
memory aliasing and address space separation errors, however it is unclear whether
these properties will be shown to be respected by the hypervisor’s implementation.
Outline
In Sect. 2 we discuss implementation issues and formal model of a microkernel.
We brieﬂy formalize all concepts necessary to present the microkernel correctness
criteria which have to be satisﬁed by its primitives. Next, in Sect. 3, we elaborate
on our veriﬁcation methodology and sketch the semantics of C programs with inline
assembler parts. In Sect. 4 we proceed with the correctness theorem for a primitive.
The presented approach is supported by the case study in Sect. 5 for which the
primitive that copies data between processes is selected. We conclude in Sect. 6.
Notation
We denote the set of boolean values by B and the set of natural numbers in-
cluding zero by N. We denote the set of natural numbers less then x by Nx. We
denote the list of n elements of type T by T n. The elements of a list x are accessed
by x[i], its length is denoted by |x|. The operator 〈x〉 yields for a bit string x ∈ Bn
the natural number represented by x. We allow to interchange a bitvector x with
its value 〈x〉. The set of all possible conﬁgurations of a concept x is deﬁned by Cx.
2 An Academic Operating System Microkernel
We consider an exemplary academic microkernel which provides mechanisms for the
(i) process and memory management, (ii) address spaces, (iii) IPC, and (iv) device
communication.
2.1 Implementation Issues
The microkernel implements the Communicating Virtual Machines (CVM) [3]
model which deﬁnes the parallel execution of concurrent user processes interact-
ing with a kernel. According to the model the microkernel is split into two logical
parts: (i) the abstract kernel which provides an interface to a user or an operat-
ing system and could be implemented in a pure high-level programming language,
and (ii) the lower layers which implement the desired functionality stated in the
beginning of Sect. 2. The implementation of the low-level functionality necessarily
contains assembler portions because processor registers and user processes could
not be accessed by ordinary C variables. By linking the two kernel parts together
the concrete kernel, a program which can run on a target machine, is obtained.
The kernel lower layers could be split into three logical parts: (i) primitives,
(ii) a page fault handler, and (iii) context switch routines. Within the paper we
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Name Description Comment
copy copies data between processes A
phys copy copies data between virtual and the physical memory A
get vm word reads a word from the virtual memory of a process A
set vm word writes a word to the virtual memory of a process A
out word writes a word to a device AD
in word reads a word from a device AD
virt io copies data between a device and a process AD
phys io copies data between a device and the physical memory AD
phys io range I/O operations on port ranges AD
reset initializes the memory and the registers of a process
get vm gpr reads a register of a process
set vm gpr writes a register of a process
alloc gives additional memory to a process
free releases a given amount of the memory of a process
clone clones a process
set mask mask external interrupts
Table 1
List of primitives of the microkernel
discuss the correctness of primitives. They are implemented in the C0 program-
ming language [7], a slightly restricted C, with inline assembler parts. In brief, the
limitations of C0 compared to standard C are as follows. Preﬁx and postﬁx arith-
metic expressions, e.g., i++, are forbidden, as well as function calls as a part of
expressions. Pointers are typed and do not point to local variables or to functions.
Void pointers and pointer arithmetic are not supported. The size of arrays has to
be statically deﬁned.
2.2 Primitives
The academic microkernel contains 16 primitives described in Table 1. The comment
’A’ denotes that a primitive has an inline assembler portion. The comment ’D’
designates that a primitive accesses devices. Thus, the primitives can be divided
into three groups: (i) 7 primitives implemented in pure C0, (ii) 4 primitives which
have assembler portions, and (iii) 5 primitives which have assembler portions and
access devices. In this paper we give the methodology for veriﬁcation of code written
in C0 with inline assembler. It is applicable to all the primitives. However, we have
veriﬁed so far primitives from the second group.
2.3 A Formal Model
The CVM model deﬁnes a parallel execution of the kernel and N user processes
on an underlying physical machine with a hard disk. According to CVM, the C0
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language semantics is used to model the computation of the kernel, and semantics
of virtual machines models the computation of user processes. In the following, we
outline the necessary concepts of the model: (i) physical and virtual machines [3],
(ii) a hard disk [5], and (iii) C0 machines [7]. Having them, we sketch the CVM
semantics and give its correctness criteria. For details cf. [6]. Memories of physical
and virtual machines are conceptually organized in pages of P machine words.
2.3.1 Physical Machines
Physical machines are the sequential programming model of the VAMP hardware [2]
as seen by a system software programmer. They are parameterized by (i) the
set SAP ⊆ B5 of special purpose register addresses visible to physical machines,
and (ii) the number TPP of total physical memory pages which deﬁnes the set
PMA = {a | 0 ≤ 〈a〉 < TPP · P} ⊆ B30 of accessible physical memory addresses.
The machines are records pm=(pc, dpc, gpr, spr,m) with the following components:
(i) the normal pm.pc ∈ B32 and the delayed pm.dpc ∈ B32 program counters used to
implement the delayed branch mechanism, (ii) the general purpose pm.gpr ∈ B5 →
B
32 and the special purpose pm.spr ∈ SAP → B32 register ﬁles, and (iii) the word
addressable physical memory pm.m ∈ PMA → B32.
The computation is possible in two modes: user and system. In user mode a
memory access to a virtual address va is subject to address translation. It either
redirects to the translated physical memory address or generates a page fault in-
terrupt which signals that the desired page is not in the physical memory. The
decision is made by examining the valid bit v(pm, va) maintained by the memory
management unit of the physical machine. When on, it signals that the page storing
the virtual address va resides in the main memory, elsewise, it is on a hard disk.
The semantics of an uninterrupted execution is deﬁned by the underlying
instruction set architecture (ISA). On an interrupt signal, which could be inter-
nal or external, the machines switches to the system mode and invokes a special
piece of software—an interrupt handler. Within the paper, we are interested in two
particular kinds of interrupts: (i) page faults, and (ii) system call exceptions. A
page fault is treated by the page fault handler, a routine which translates addresses
and loads missing pages from a hard disk into the physical memory. Its implemen-
tation servers several purposes. For instance, it could be used to handle a page fault
and to guarantee that no page fault will occur within a certain period in the future.
The latter property is needed for the primitives, thus, they heavily call the handler
(for details cf. Sect. 2.5). System call exceptions occur due to a special instruction,
called the trap. It is used by an assembler programmer in order to invoke one of the
system calls provided by the operating system microkernel. System calls, viewed
from a simpliﬁed perspective, are just the wrappers around the primitives.
2.3.2 Virtual Machines
Virtual machines are the hardware model visible for user processes. They give user
an illusion of an address space exceeding the physical memory. No address transla-
tion is required, hence page faults are invisible. The virtual machine’s parameters
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are: (i) the number TVP of total v irtual memory pages which deﬁnes the set of
accessible v irtual memory word addresses VMA= {a | 0 ≤ 〈a〉 < TVP · P} ⊆ B30,
and (ii) the set SAV ⊆ SAP of special purpose registers addresses visible to v irtual
machines. Their conﬁguration, formally, is a record vm=(pc, dpc, gpr, spr,m) where
only vm.spr ∈ SAV → B32 and vm.m ∈ VMA → B32 diﬀer from the physical ma-
chines. Semantics is completely speciﬁed by the ISA with the following exception.
Due to safety reasons we split the set SAV into two parts: (i) the set SAVR of
read only register addresses, and (ii) the set SAVW of addresses of registers that
could be completely accessed by a user. A write attempt to a register vm.spr[x]
with x ∈ SAV R has no eﬀect. The set SAV R contains the register ptl (page table
length). It stores the amount of virtual memory allocated to the process measured
in pages. We abbreviate vm.spr[ptl]=vm.ptl.
2.3.3 Integrating a Hard Disk
We use the formal model of a hard disk based on the ATA/ATAPI protocol.
We denote the conﬁguration of the hard disk by hd. Only the component
hd.sm ∈ N230 → N232 which models the disk content as a word-addressable memory
is of our interest. A step of the system (pm, hd) comprising the physical machine
and the hard disk is denoted by the function δ(pm, hd) = (pm′, hd′). If no write
instruction to the disk is executed only the physical machine is updated according
to its semantics. Otherwise, both pm and hd are changed.
2.3.4 C0 Machines
A C0 machine is a record c = (pr , tt , ft , rd , lms , hm). Its components are: (i) the
program rest c.pr , a sequence of statements which still has to be executed, (ii) the
typetable c.tt which collects information about types used in the program, (iii) the
function table c.ft storing information about functions of the program, (iv) the
recursion depth c.rd , (v) the local memory stack c.lms mapping numbers i ≤ c.rd to
memory frames which implement a relatively low-level memory model and comprise
components for the number of variables in a frame, their names, types, and contents,
and (vi) the heap memory c.hm which is a memory frame as well.
The global memory of a C0 machine c is c.lms(0). The top local memory frame
is denoted by top(c)= c.lms(c.rd). A memory frame ﬁrst includes the parameters
of the corresponding function. A variable of a machine c is a pair (m, i), where m
is a memory frame and i is the number of the variable in the frame. By va(c, i)=
(top(c), i) we denote the i-th variable of the current function context.
2.3.5 Communicating Virtual Machines
The CVM conﬁguration is formally a record cvm= (up, ak, cp) with the following
components: (i) the list of N user processes cvm.up ∈ CNvm represented by virtual
machines, (ii) the abstract kernel cvm.ak ∈ Cc modeled by a C0 machine, and
(iii) the current process identiﬁer cvm.cp ∈ NN , where cvm.cp = 0 stands for the
kernel. The CVM semantics distinguishes user and kernel computations. In case
cvm.cp 	= 0 the user process pid = cvm.cp is intended to make a step. In case
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no interrupt occurs it boils down to the step of the virtual machine cvm.up[pid].
Otherwise, the kernel dispatcher is invoked and the kernel computation starts. The
kernel dispatcher handles possible page faults and determines whether a primitive
f is meant to be executed. In case it is, the parameters of the primitive pf are
extracted by means of the system call mechanism. The speciﬁcation fS is applied
to the user processes cvm′.up= fS(cvm.up, pf). Next, the user computation resumes.
2.4 Correctness Criteria
Microkernel correctness requirements have to relate: (i) the implementation of ker-
nel lower layers, encoded by the C0 machine c, (ii) the CVM model cvm, and (iii) the
physical machine with the hard disk (pm, hd).
The implementation c is related to the CVM model by means of linking. We use
the formal speciﬁcation of the linking operator link(cvm.ak, c)=k. It takes two C0
machines encoding the abstract kernel and the implementation of its lower layers,
respectively, and produces the concrete kernel k, also a C0 machine. We state that
the concrete kernel k correctly runs on the physical machine pm by means of the
C0 compiler consistency relation (cf. Sect. 3.2).
The correctness criteria for the user processes is hidden inside the memory virtu-
alization relation. This simulation relation, called the B-relation, speciﬁes a parallel
execution of the user processes cvm.up on one physical machine pm. In order to
specify the B-relation, let us ﬁrst give a notion of a process control block (PCB). The
PCBs are C0 data structures permanently residing in the memory of the underly-
ing physical machine. They store the information about visible registers of all user
processes. Thus, we are able to reconstruct user virtual machines from the contexts
stored in the PCBs. The function virt(pid, pm, hd)=vm yields the virtual machine
for the process pid by taking the register values from the corresponding PCB ﬁelds.
The memory component vm.m of the built virtual machine is constructed out of




pm.m[pma(pid, a)] if v(pm, a)
hd.sm[sma(pid, a)] otherwise
.
The physical memory address is computed by the function pma(pid, a) while the
swap memory address is yielded by the function sma(pid, a) (for the deﬁnitions
cf. [1,6]). Then, the B-relation is deﬁned formally as follows:
B(cvm.up, pm, hd)=∀pid ∈ NN : virt(pid, pm, hd)=cvm.up[pid].
There is a number of additional correctness demands omitted due to the space
limitations.
2.5 A Page Fault Handler
The B-relation can only be maintained with an appropriate page fault handler.
The page fault handler is a routine which serves two purposes. Called for a virtual
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address va and a process identiﬁer pid it (i) yields to the caller the translated
physical memory address pma(pid, va), and (ii) guarantees that the page storing
pma(pid, va) resides in the physical memory of the machine running the handler.
Possibly called twice in a primitive in order to translate addresses for diﬀerent
processes, it must respect the following. An appropriate page fault handler must
not swap out the memory page that was swapped in during a previous call to it. In
order to guarantee this a proper page eviction strategy must be used. We support
two lists, called active and free, for the page management. Together they describe
all pages of physical memory accessible to a user. Items of the free list describe the
pages that immediately could be given to user, i.e., without swapping out a page to
the hard disk. Active list describes physical pages that store a virtual page. When
all physical memory is occupied, a page from the active list is evicted and replaced
by the one loaded from the hard disk according to the FIFO strategy. For formal
details and correctness issues cf. [1].
3 Veriﬁcation Approach
There are several possibilities to argue about the correctness of kernel lower lay-
ers, and in particular of primitives. One might have an idea to reason about their
object code in the machine language semantics. Due to the huge size of the target
code—the kernel lower layers translated by the C0 compiler are 11K lines long—
this approach seems to be unfeasible for the interactive veriﬁcation. Running to
extremes, one can try to verify system code on a very high-level of abstraction, e.g.,
by means of a generic veriﬁcation environment for imperative programs [11], and
then transfer the results down to the necessary level introducing reﬁnement theo-
rems. However, techniques that allow reasoning about mixture of C and assembler
code in such environments were only recently invented (the approach is used in [1]).
They basically aim at big C programs with assembler portions, isolated in separate
functions. Since this is not the case for the primitives—they are relatively small
C functions which can have several inline assembler parts—we decided to do the
formal veriﬁcation in a mixture of C0 small step and inline assembler semantics.
3.1 Veriﬁcation Environment
We use Isabelle/HOL theorem prover as the basis for the veriﬁcation environment.
All the concepts and their semantics listed in Sect. 2.3 were formalized in Isabelle
by the colleagues in the Verisoft project. The source code of the primitives is
automatically translated by a tool into the C0 small step semantics in Isabelle.
3.2 C with Inline Assembler Semantics
A C0 conﬁguration c is related to the underlying physical machine pm by the com-
piler simulation relation consis(alloc)(c, pm) parameterized over an allocation func-
tion alloc which maps C0 variables to the physical memory cells. Essentially, the
relation is a conjunction of the following facts: (i) value consistency: the respective
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Figure 1. Switching C and assembler semantics
variables of c and pm have the same values and the reachable portions of the heaps
in c.hm and pm.m are isomorphic, (ii) control consistency: the delayed program
counter pm.dpc points to the start of the translated code of the ﬁrst statement of
c.pr and pm.pc= pm.dpc + 4, (iii) code consistency: the compiled code lies at the
correct address in the memory pm.m, and (iv) stack consistency: the heap resp.
stack pointers which reside in the registers pm.gpr[29] resp. pm.gpr[30] point to the
ﬁrst free address of c.hm resp. to the beginning of top(c). For details cf. [7].
An assembler instruction list il can be integrated by a special statement asm(il)
into the C0 code. As long as no such statement occurs the C0 semantics is ap-
plied. The former approach to deal with veriﬁcation of an assembler statement is to
maintain the compiler consistency relation with execution of every single instruc-
tion from il (cf. Sect. 4.3 of [3]). This method turned out to be inconvenient due to
excessive complexity of formal proofs, therefore a new one was developed and used.
In brief, the novel approach is as follows. On an assembler statement the ex-
ecution is switched to the consistent underlying physical machine and continues
directly there. When the assembler instructions have been executed we switch back
to the C0 level. For this we have to update the C0 machine possibly aﬀected by the
assembler instructions. The allocation function alloc makes it possible to determine
which variables of the C0 machine have changed. We retrieve their values from the
physical machine and write back to the C0 memory conﬁguration.
Let c be the C0 conﬁguration with c.pr=asm(il); r, and let pm be the physical
machine consistent to c w.r.t. the allocation function alloc, i.e., consis(alloc)(c, pm).
From the consistency relation we have that the program counters of pm point to the
address of the assembler statement: pm.dpc=ad(asm(il)) and pm.pc=pm.dpc + 4,
where ad(s) yields for a statement s its address in the memory of pm. This allows
us to start reasoning about the correctness of the assembler code il directly in the
semantics of the physical machine. Let pm′ be the physical machines conﬁguration
after executing il. In order to formally specify the eﬀect of an execution of asm(il)
on the C0 machine c we deﬁne the function upd(c, pm, pm′) = c′ which analyzes
the diﬀerence between pm and pm′ and projects it to the C0 level updating the
conﬁguration c to c′ (cf. Fig. 1). A number of restrictions are imposed on the changes
in the physical machine, which guarantee that the C0 machine is not destroyed by
the assembler portion il , namely: (i) the program pointers after the execution of il
point to the end of il : pm′.dpc=pm.dpc + 4 · |il |, (ii) the memory region where the
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compiled code is stored stays the same, i.e., we forbid self-modifying code, (iii) the
stack and heap pointers are unchanged: pm′.gpr[x] = pm.gpr[x] for x ∈ {29, 30},
(iv) the memory occupied be the local memory frames remains the same except
for top(c), and (v) pointers change is forbidden except setting them to null. We
formally prove that we deal with assembler portions which meet these restrictions.
The program rest is updated straightforwardly—the assembler statement is re-
moved, i.e., c′.pr= r. The memory update proceeds separately for the global, the
top local, and the heap memories. For each of them the respective memory cells of
the physical machines conﬁgurations pm and pm′ are compared. In case a memory
cell at an address a is changed, the value of the variable x, s.t. alloc(c′, x) = a is
updated with pm′.m[a]. However, the compiler correctness relation does not nec-
essarily hold between the C0 conﬁguration c′ and the physical machine pm′. The
control consistency will be broken if the assembler statement asm(il) is either (i) the
last statement of a loop body, or (ii) the last statement of the ’then’ part of a condi-
tional statement. The translation of these statements to the target code results in a
list of assembler instructions il ′ which has to be executed by the machine pm′ in or-
der to reach a consistent to c′ state. Note that il ′ contains only control instructions,
and, hence does not aﬀect any C0 variable. Executing il ′ we transit from pm′ to
pm′′ updating the program counters and regain consistency consis(alloc)(c′, pm′′).
4 Correctness of a Primitive
Since primitives are parts of the microkernel, their correctness is closely related to
the correctness of the whole kernel. Execution of a primitive is one of the induc-
tion cases of the overall kernel correctness theorem [6]. We distinguish two main
theorems for each primitive: (i) the primitives functional correctness, and (ii) the
top-level correctness of a primitive. The latter is used to prove the induction case
of the overall kernel correctness theorem and, therefore, claims correctness criteria
needed for the integration, for instance that the abstract kernel data is not cor-
rupted. The former is used as an auxiliary theorem to prove the latter. It states
the correctness of the input-output relation of a primitive call. Such modularization
increases the robustness of formal theories to the possible code changes, e.g., due
to the errors disclosed during the veriﬁcation. In this case, one has to adapt the
proofs only of the ﬁrst theorem which is much simpler than the second one. Next,
we present the general idea behind these theorems and discuss their formal proofs.
4.1 Functional Correctness
The functional correctness justiﬁes the input/output relation of a primitive. We
start in some C0 state k encoding the concrete kernel and consistent to the under-
lying physical machine pm and claim the requirements pref(k, pm) to a primitive f
caller. We end in the resulting state obtaining the desired values postf(k
′, pm′) of
C0 variables and memory cells of the physical machine. Note that both pre- and
postconditions, in general, speak not only about values of C0 variables, but also
about the memory parts of the underlying machine which are not accessible via
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variables but are subject to change by inline assembler code. The straightforward
idea of the functional correctness is reﬂected in the next theorem.
Theorem 4.1 (Functional Correctness of a Primitive) Let k be the concrete
kernel calling the primitive f with the parameters pf: k.pr = f(pf); r. Let (pm,hd)
be the conﬁguration of the underlying physical machine with the hard disk, s.t.
it is consistent to the concrete kernel: consis(alloc)(k, pm). Assume that the pre-
condition pref(k, pm) to the primitive is satisﬁed, then there exist (i) a number of
steps T of the physical machine with the hard disk, s.t. (pm′, hd′)=δT (pm, hd), and
(ii) a conﬁguration of the concrete kernel k′ with an appropriate allocation function
alloc ′, s.t. they are consistent to the physical machine: consis(alloc ′)(k′, pm′), and
the desired postcondition postf(k
′, pm′) holds.
In our experience it is inconvenient to prove such theorems directly. We rather
create several separate lemmas of the same form but speaking about the code in
diﬀerent semantics. For example, if a primitive contains a number of assembler
instructions wrapped both from the beginning and the end in C0 code, we create
three lemmas: one for the C0 part before assembler, next for the assembler portion,
and, ﬁnally, for the remaining C0 part. This simple idea is easily scalable to arbi-
trary combinations of C and assembler. We prove such lemmas by applying C0 and
inline assembler semantics. The crucial point is the construction of a consistent C0
machine after the assembler part execution. We proceed as described in Sect. 3.2.
The veriﬁcation proceeds, certainly, with respect to the total correctness criteria,
i.e., we show the termination and the absence of run-time errors. The machinery
for this is hidden inside the C0 small step semantics. The set Cc of all possible C0
conﬁgurations is represented formally in Isabelle by the option type which extends
Cc with an additional error state. The semantics is constructed in a way that the
computation ends in a non-error state only in the case that no run-time errors occur.
We formally show that the resulting conﬁguration of a primitive call is not in the
faulting state. We do this in an iterative fashion, i.e., we show that the execution of
every single statement brings some sensible conﬁguration. This could happen only
in case all expressions of the statements are correctly evaluated. The correctness
demands to the expression evaluation forces us to show formally that neither null-
pointer dereference nor out-of-boundary array access happens. This also proves
the termination of single statements. In order to guarantee the termination of a
whole program provided that statements terminate we have to show that neither
inﬁnite loops nor inﬁnite recursive calls occur. Since we do not use recursion in
the kernel implementation, we pay attention only to loops. Their termination is
closely related to the way loops are veriﬁed in the C0 semantics. The correctness
of a loop is established by an inductive lemma. We formally specify the number of
the loop iterations by a ranking function over the variables modiﬁed in the loop.
Since we proceed by induction on the result yielded by the ranking function, the
termination follows. We give details in the example (cf. Sect. 5.3). The absence
of run-time errors in assembler portions boils down to the absence of interrupts
conditions which are required to the proven by the inline assembler semantics. The
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Figure 2. Memory structure of the microkernel claimed by the kernel invariant
termination of assembler loops is proven analogously to C0 loops.
4.2 Correctness in the Context of the Kernel
The correctness criteria needed for the integration are, basically, split into two parts.
They are: (i) the kernel correctness requirements stated in Sect. 2.4, and (ii) the
kernel invariant which turns out to be necessary to be proven ﬁrst. The kernel
invariant inv(cvm, k, pm, hd) is the conjunction of the following statements: (i) the
memory map properties, (ii) the page fault handler invariants, (iii) the validity of
the C0 machine encoding the concrete kernel, and (iv) the hard disk properties and
liveness requirements for the system ’hard disk - physical machine’.
4.2.1 Memory Map Properties
The kernel code has a particular alignment in the memory. Its data structures lie
both in the global and the heap memories. For safety reasons we must know these
regions, and know which of their parts could be changed with every step of the
kernel, for instance with the execution of a primitive. Fig. 2 depicts the memory
structure which we describe formally.
4.2.2 Page Fault Handler Invariants
As mentioned in Sect. 2.5, the page fault handler is (heavily) called by the kernel.
The handler maintains a variety of global data structures, in particular lists for
page management. Therefore, we must claim that no functions besides the page
fault handler are allowed to modify its data structures. Due to the complexity
of the page fault handler its veriﬁcation is attempted by means of the reﬁnement
technique which connects its representation on several semantical layers. In order
to support that approach, we formally preserve: (i) the mapping between the im-
plementation of the kernel lower layers c which contains the handler and the PFH
abstraction, and (ii) the validity properties over the handler abstraction. The page
fault handler properties relevant for the primitives correctness comprise: (i) for dis-
tinct pairs (pid1, va1) 	= (pid2, va2) the translated physical addresses are distinct:
pma(pid1, va1) 	= pma(pid2, va2), (ii) every physical address is associated exactly
with one pair (pid, va), and (iii) all translated addresses lie outside the kernel range:
∀(pid, va) : pma(pid, va) 	∈ [0 : KERNEL END).
Next, we present the top-level correctness theorem of a primitive execution. It
turns out that its proof requires several static properties pro(cvm.ak, c) over the
abstract kernel and the implementation of the kernel lower layers. They are the
necessary preconditions to a correct linking and state, not exclusively, the following:
(i) the function tables cvm.ak.ft and c.ft encode the same function signatures, (ii) all
external function declarations in cvm.ak.ft have an implementation in c.ft and vice
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Figure 3. Algorithm and structure of auxiliary lemmas for the copy primitive
versa, and (iii) the type tables cvm.ak.tt and c.tt encode the same types.
Theorem 4.2 (Top-level Correctness of a Primitive) Let k be the concrete
kernel calling the primitive f with the parameters pf: k.pr = f(pf); r. Let cvm
be the conﬁguration of the CVM model, and (pm,hd) be the conﬁguration of the
underlying physical machine with the hard disk. Assume that (i) the concrete
kernel is consistent to the physical machine: consis(alloc)(k, pm), (ii) the relation
B(cvm.up, pm, hd) holds, (iii) the preconditions pref(k, pm) to the primitive are sat-
isﬁed, (iv) the kernel invariant inv(cvm, k, pm, hd) holds, and (v) the kernel static
properties pro(cvm.ak, c) are satisﬁed, then there exists a number of steps T of the
physical machine with the hard disk, s.t. (pm′, hd′)=δT (pm, hd) after which (i) the
CVM model executes the primitive and the relation B(fS(cvm.up, pf), pm
′, hd′) still
holds, (ii) the concrete kernel executes the primitive and is still consistent to the
physical machine: ∃k′, alloc ′ : consis(alloc ′)(k′, pm′) ∧ k′.pr =r, and (iii) the kernel
invariant is preserved: inv(cvm′, k′, pm′, hd′).
5 Case Study: Copying Data Between Processes
As an application of the developed approach we show how we establish the correct-
ness of the copy primitive 4 . It is intended to copy n words from a process pid1 at
address a1 to a process pid2 at address a2. In the context of an operating system
it is widely used to implement process management routines, as well as IPC. The
correctness is justiﬁed by the instances of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, where f = copy,
and pf=pcopy=pid1, pid2, a1, a2, n.
5.1 Algorithm
Let copyasm(pa1, pa2, s) be an assembler fragment that copies s words in the memory
from a physical address pa1 to pa2. The algorithm behind the copy primitive is as
follows. In a loop until n words are processed, we compute the size s of portions to
be copied respecting the page borders of both processes. The crucial observation is
that both pages, from and to which we copy, must be present in the physical memory.
This is achieved by two consecutive calls to the page fault handler which compute
physical addresses pa1 = pma(pid1, a1) and pa2 = pma(pid2, a2) and guarantee that
both pages containing pa1 and pa2 reside in the main memory. We proceed with
the copying by executing copyasm(pa1, pa2, s). The idea is depicted in Fig. 3.
4 Implementation and Isabelle/HOL theories containing proofs are available from www.verisoft.de.
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5.2 Speciﬁcation
The speciﬁcation of the primitive has to reﬂect the changes on (i) the user processes
cvm.up of the model, (ii) the concrete kernel k, and (iii) the underlying physical
machine pm. Of course we do not specify just the same conditions in terms of each
modiﬁed machine because they are interconnected through the simulation relations.
We deﬁne the desired result on a suﬃcient level of abstraction. Nevertheless, there is
a number of necessary properties, mostly of technical nature, that could be expressed
only in terms of the implementation machines k and pm.
Eﬀects on the Model
Let for a memory m an access to d consecutive cells starting at address a is abbre-
viated as md[a]=m[a+d−1]◦. . .◦m[a]. The eﬀect of the primitive execution on the
model is given by the function copyS(cvm.up, pid1, pid2, a1, a2, n) = cvm
′.up which
updates the memory of the user process pid2, i.e., the virtual machine cvm.up[pid2]:
cvm′.up[i].mn[a] =
{
cvm.up[pid1].mn[a1] if i=pid2 ∧ a=a2
cvm.up[i].mn[a] otherwise
.
The result of copyS is welldeﬁned only if the preconditions
precopyS (cvm.up, pid1, pid2, a1, a2, n) are satisﬁed. Otherwise, the same trick
as with C0 machines is used. The model state space Ccvm is extended with a single
error state which signals, in particular, that the preconditions to a primitive are
not justiﬁed. The validity requirements over a model run prevent error states.
The predicate precopyS encodes formally the following: (i) the amount to be
copied is reasonable: n > 0, (ii) we copy between diﬀerent processes: pid1 	= pid2,
(iii) since memories of virtual machines are word-addressable, the addresses a1
and a2 are divisible by 4, (iv) process identiﬁers pid1 and pid2 lie in the interval
[1, N), (v) virtual machines vm1 = cvm.up[pid1] resp. vm2 = cvm.up[pid2] have
amount of virtual memory storing resp. suﬃcient to store the desired portion, i.e.,
ax/4 + n < vmx.ptl · P , x ∈ {1, 2}.
Eﬀects on the Implementation
The intended modiﬁcations of the physical machine pm, on top of which the
concrete kernel k runs are deﬁned by the postcondition postcopy(k
′, pm′). First, it
claims the value of the result variable of the call. Next, it describes the changes in
the physical memory of the updated machine pm′. Recall that a virtual address va of
a process pid is translated to the physical one by means of the function pma(pid, va).
Then, the step-by-step changes over the physical memory are:
pm′.ms[a] =
{
pm.ms[pma(pid1, a1)] if a=pma(pid2, a2)
pm.ms[a] otherwise
.
The result is obtained only if the precondition is satisﬁed. The predicate
precopy(k) deﬁnes the indispensable demands to the C0 implementation. Basically,
it speaks about parameters and results of the call and demands that: (i) the pa-
rameters va(k, i), 0 ≤ i < 5 of the primitive are welltyped, evaluate without errors,
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storing valid values, and (ii) the result variable of the call is present in top(k).
We do not have any special demands to the physical machine before the call to
copy. Nevertheless, it is worth to mention the preconditions precopy
asm
(pm) to the
assembler portion copyasm(pa1, pa2, s) of the function. They are discharged when
we verify the C0 preﬁx of the function and perform the semantics switch. The
requirements comprise, among others, the following conditions: (i) s > 0, (ii) the
addresses are divisible by 4 and bounded by the total amount of physical memory
pax/4 + s < TPP · P , x ∈ {1, 2}, and (iii) the memory regions between which we
copy do not overlap: [pa1/4 : pa1/4 + s) 	 ∩ [pa2/4 : pa2/4 + s).
5.3 Proving Correctness
In order to prove Theorem 4.1 we show the following separate lemmas for the
correctness of: (i) the C0 code inside the loop up to the ﬁrst call to the page fault
handler, (ii) the two consecutive calls to the page fault handler, (iii) the inline
assembler portion, (iv) the remaining C0 part of the loop body, and (v) the whole
loop, which makes use of the four previous lemmas (cf. Fig. 3). We motivate such
modularization as follows. We create separate lemmas for the items i, iii, and iv
because they describe code portions in alternating semantics. The case ii is treated
specially as it speaks about the properties derived from the page fault handler
speciﬁcation. They are used for lemma iii, but either invisible or not important in
the other lemmas.
The proof proceeds by applying the respective semantics to the code statement
by statement. In order to prove the loop, i.e., lemma v, we formally specify the
ranking function r(n, a1, a2)= i, s.t. r(0, a1, a2)=0 which counts the number i of the
remaining loop iterations. The lemma has an inductive fashion with the step of the
form P (k, pm, i)=⇒P (k′, pm′, i− 1). Hence, its proof justiﬁes the loop termination.
Lemma ii argues that after two consecutive calls to the page fault handler for the
computation of physical memory addresses pa1 and pa2 both pages containing these
addresses reside in the physical memory. A design requirement not to swap out the
page that was swapped in during the previous run is respected by the page fault
handler. However, this property cannot be stated directly in its speciﬁcation. It is
expressed in the speciﬁcation of two successive calls to the page fault handler. We
deal with the problem as follows. Let page(pa) denote the physical page correspond-
ing to the physical address pa. We have a look at the eviction algorithm stated in
the page fault handlers formal speciﬁcation and ﬁnd out the property ev(p) a page
p must obey in order to be evicted during the next call to the handler. The ﬁrst
call to the handler yields the translated physical memory address pa1. The swapped
in page is then page(pa1). We prove that ¬ev(page(pa1)) holds after the ﬁrst call
the page fault handler. Since there is no code between the two handler calls, this
property holds in the precondition to the second call for free.
Lemma iii states that the physical addresses from (pa1) and to (pa2) which we
copy are associated with processes pid1 resp. pid2 and do not belong to the kernel
range. This ensures kernel safety—the assembler portion does not destroy kernel
by modifying its data structures—and security, for instance we do not disclose page
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tables by coping them to a user process. Next, lemma states that pa1 and pa2 do
not belong to the hard disk port address range, guaranteeing that no swap data is
disclosed or modiﬁed . The proof exploits lemma ii because most of these properties
are inferred from the page fault handler validity (cf. Sect. 4.2.2).
The proof of Theorem 4.2 uses the functional correctness established above. The
essential proof goals are the implication from the postcondition postcopy(k
′, pm′)
to (i) the B-relation B(fS(cvm.up, pf), pm
′, hd′), and (ii) the kernel invariant
inv(cvm′, k′, pm′, hd′). The proof of the former necessarily exploits the fact that
the B-relation is preserved under the page fault handler. Since the relation is not
aﬀected by the C0 parts of the primitive—we do not write to PCBs and cannot
modify the memory region beyond C0 variables—it remains to show that the B-
relation is not destroyed by the assembler fragment. Here, since we transfer data
between pages residing in the physical memory formally described in lemma iii and
perform the respective memory updates on the model cvm and on the physical ma-
chine pm as stated in Sect. 5.2, the relation follows. During the kernel invariant
proof we examine postcopy(k
′, pm′) in order to determine which C0 variables and
memory parts are changed by the primitive. From this the invariant is concluded.
6 Summing Up
We have shown how the problem of formal correctness of microkernel primitives
is solved exploiting a novel approach to veriﬁcation of C with inline assembler
programs. We conclude by giving statistics and directions for further research.
Complexity
The implementation of 16 primitives consumes about 600 lines of code. We
have veriﬁed 3 primitives so far—copy, get vm word, and set vm word—which are
implemented with 100 lines. The functional correctness of the exemplary primitive
(Theorem 4.1) is established in about 2K proof steps, where proofs in C0 and in
assembler semantics are related as 2:1 5 . The integration of these results into the
kernel context (Theorem 4.2) requires about 5K commands using general kernel
lemmas of technical nature proven in 5K steps.
Further Work: Gaining from Automated Veriﬁcation
Although we used mostly interactive veriﬁcation techniques there is a room
for the automation. One can gain from methods of automated veriﬁcation while
proving the functional correctness of source code. We used the ML code generation
mechanism for the proof of the microkernel source code wellformdness properties
required by the C0 compiler correctness theorem. That saved about 1K proof
commands. Next possible candidate for proof automation are assembler portions.
Due to the relatively simple ﬁnite memory model it might be possible to obtain the
values of desired memory cells by means of model checking. In order to ease the C0
5 Approximately the same proportion holds for the respective parts of the implementation.
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part veriﬁcation, one can think of a Hoare logic environment for the C0 small step
semantics which will automatically generate veriﬁcation conditions to be proven.
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